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Abstract In a distributed product realization environment, new paradigms and accompanying software systems are
necessary to support the collaborative work of geographically dispersed engineering teams from different disciplines who
have different knowledge, experience, tools and resources. To verify the concept of collaboration by separation, we propose
a generic information communication medium to enable knowledge representation and exchange between engineering
teams, a digital interface. Across digital interfaces, each engineering team maintains its own perspective towards the
product realization problem, and each controls a subset of design variables and seeks to maximize its own payoff function
subject to individual constraints. Hence, we postulate the use of principles from game theory to model the relationships
between engineering teams and facilitate collaborative decision making without causing unnecessary information exchange
or iteration across digital interfaces. A product design and manufacturing scenario is introduced to demonstrate the efficacy
of using game theory to maintain a clean interface between design and manufacturing teams.
Keywords collaboration, distributed product realization, game theory, digital interface

1 Frame of reference
We believe the appropriate method of implementing collaborative product realization in a distributed environment is to
separate the decision-making activities by constructing digital interfaces between the activities. The digital interface must be
standard and discipline-independent, and capable of “representing knowledge in computer readable and retrievable format,
sharing among collaborative team members, and facilitating design reuse for new concept generation” [1,2]. The notion of a
digital interface was initially raised in a National Science Foundation Workshop on Design Methodology for Solid Freeform
Fabrication [3] (presently called additive manufacturing, AM). Although originally a digital interface was restricted to a
way of transferring only geometric information, we extend the concept to include all types of design knowledge such as
design requirements, design rationales and an understanding of system capability and constraints. A digital interface capable
of transferring enough information about a product realization activity so that the recipient teams can make decisions
without additional information exchange or iteration is called “clean” digital interface [3].
Transferring information between engineering teams is a significant research problem in collaborative product realization.
Chao and Wang [4] presented a data exchange framework between different computer aided design (CAD) and computer
aided manufacturing (CAM) users, in which AutoCAD files are translated into STEP (Standard for the Exchange of Product
Model Data) to enable data sharing. Wu et al. [5] presented cloud-based design and manufacturing as a new paradigm that
will “drive digital manufacturing and design innovation”. Whitfield et al. [6] presented a Virtual Integration Platform (VIP)
for the integration of CAD and computer fluid dynamics models in a distributed environment. Eynard et al. [7] developed
Web Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) for the integration of CAD and finite element analysis (FEA) models.
Kleiner et al. [8] presented an extended parametric information model for the integration of computer aided technology
(CAx) models, such as FEA and multibody system simulation. Constraints in the design activities are used to represent the
parametric relationships between these models and enable knowledge sharing across product development teams. National
Institute of Standards and Technology developed a standard language, Process Specification Language, to describe
multidisciplinary product realization activities from the general perspective [9].
A digital interface is different from product data model or standard, such as STEP, IGES (initial graphical exchange
specification), or XML (extensible markup language), which, even though it is capable of providing a complete,

unambiguous, and semantically rich definition of the physical and functional characteristics of a product, it fails to capture
the design rationale behind the product model. Whitfield et al. [10] pointed out that the implementations of elaborated data
representation model such as STEP would be too time-consuming and would significantly increase the complexity of the
product realization. The authors suggest developing an abstract data representation that provides an interface for the
definition and management of engineering data so that engineers can focus on decision-making problems in product
development. Whitfield et al. [11,12] also presented an object-oriented data model within which the abstract data type is a
super class above the CAD model, data file, etc. This concept is very similar to the digital interface we presented here.
Hoffmann and Joan-Arinyo [13,14] presented the product master model architecture, which is a unified repository
containing all the relevant product data that is shared explicitly among the various views, e.g., design and FEA views. Badin
et al. [15,16] introduced a knowledge configuration model to manage the knowledge encapsulated and ensure consistency in
the product development models. Design Rationale editor (DRed) is a software tool within the Rolls-Royce PLM toolset
that allows designers to record design decisions and rationale as the design proceeds [17]. Peng et al. [18] developed a
knowledge model that can “combine geometric model, knowledge-based analysis codes and problem-solving strategies and
processes”. A detailed and thorough review of knowledge representation in product design is presented in Ref. [19], it is
noted that completely capturing of design rationales in collaborative product realization activities remains a significant
challenge.
In this paper we use the compromise decision support problem (DSP) as a digital interface for design information
capturing and sharing. The main purpose of this paper is to present an engineering case to demonstrate the efficacy of using
game theoretical principles to keep digital interfaces clean during the product realization process.

1.1 The compromise decision support problem
A compromise DSP is a multi-objective decision model which is a hybrid formulation based on mathematical programming
and goal programming. In the compromise DSP, the objective is to satisfy a set of constraints while achieving a set of
conflicting goals as well as possible [20–22]. The mathematical formulation of the compromise DSP is given in Fig. 1 [23].

Given
An alternative to be improved
Target value for goals, Gi, i = 1, 2, …, n
Relative importance of goals, wi
Find
System variables: xj ∈ X, j = 1, 2, …, m
Deviation variables: di‒, di+
Satisfy
Goals: Ai(X)+ di‒‒di+ = Gi,
Constraints: gk(X) ≤ 0, k = 1, 2, …, p
di‒·di+= 0, di‒, di+ ≥ 0
Bounds: lbj ≤ xj ≤ ubj, j = 1, 2, …, m
Minimize
Deviation function:
n

Z  Wi (d i  d i ) ,
i 1

n

where Wi  1, Wi  0
i 1

Note: Alternative formulations for the
deviation function are available.
Fig. 1 Mathematical formulation of the compromise DSP [23]

A compromise DSP is capable of representing the design knowledge of an engineering team, as well as the design
rationale. A team’s decision is represented with a feasible design space, a set of design objectives, and a tradeoff strategy
between these design objectives. The design space is located by the bounds of system variables, [lbj, ubj], and constraints, gk.
Design objectives and requirements are modeled as design goals, Gi. The deviation variables, di‒ and di+, specify the
difference between the target value for each goal and the actual achievement of that goal (Ai). A team’s tradeoff strategy
among the goals is determined by the formulation of the deviation function, Z   Wi (di  di ) . Collaboration between
teams is also determined by which team controls which set of design variables, and by which team has higher priority in
making decisions. Therefore, the team’s capability and constraints, including those within and between activities, can be
efficaciously modeled using a compromise DSP. Moreover, once formulated, a compromise DSP can be easily reused by
assigning different parameters, mathematical formulations, software tools, etc.

Because of its standard format, a compromise DSP which is used to model the decisions of multidisciplinary teams is also
a medium for sharing knowledge among them. A digital interface is a compromise DSP formulated in the most elementary
entities, such as mathematical formulations or computer codes, which are easy to understand and implement on a computer.
In other words, the abstract data representation proposed in Ref. [10] can be implemented as Fig. 1, while other data types
such as CAD files or executable codes are easily embedded or linked to the digital interface. From one perspective, a
compromise DSP serves as the interface between an engineering team and the detailed product information and data. From
another perspective, it serves as an interface between cooperating teams because their communication is conducted by
transferring or sharing a compromise DSP.

1.2 The design and manufacturing interface in the context of AM
In the context of fabricating parts using AM technologies, different information representation formats can be used as
digital interfaces between design and manufacturing teams, and the compromise DSPs has proven to be a valuable addition
to traditional formats such as STEP, STL (Standard Template Library) and IGES. In a distributed environment, we wish to
facilitate the collaboration of design and manufacturing teams by separating their decision-making activities. By
“separation”, we mean the responsibility of product development is transferred from design team to the downstream
manufacturing teams, while the overall feasibility of the final result is still guaranteed with as little as possible information
exchange or iteration. As the manufacturing team is more knowledgeable in product manufacture, it should be able to
accomplish design for manufacturing (DfM) more effectively. To eliminate the unnecessary information exchange and
iteration, we need to test where along the design timeline we can set the digital interface and separate the design and
manufacturing teams. It may be that the design team may only accomplish functional design and preliminary geometric
design, while the manufacturing team accomplishes the remaining tasks of product realization, without causing iteration.
Generally, the process of separating design and manufacture involves three steps, as shown in Fig. 2 in which possible
activity flows are listed and candidate separation points are located between activities. Engineering teams are then assigned
to accomplish these activities and a suitable position for the digital interface is selected. Finally, engineering teams use
game theory to makes decisions collaboratively.
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Minimize
ZA (xA )

M anufact uring P layer
Given
xB, sB
Find
xB, d-i , d+i
Satisfy
GB (xB, sB )  di- -d+i  0
CB (xB, sB )  0
Minimize
ZB (xB )

Fig. 2 Design-manufacturing interfaces

A product realization process in the context of AM is shown at top of Fig. 2. At the first step, a manufacturing process
and a part material must be selected prior to fabrication. The second step, geometric tailoring, includes any design
operations required to ensure manufacturability. Then the part can be manufactured. Three different sequences of activity
flows are shown as A, B and C. In some cases, no geometric tailoring may be necessary, as in flow A. For example, when a
company orders a prototype from a service bureau, it probably does not change the design to facilitate the AM process.
Sometimes however, geometric tailoring is required to ensure that the fabricated (printed) product functions identically to
the designed part, flow B. Flow C includes iterations between material and process selection and geometric tailoring. Such
iterations are necessary if the selection depends upon the extent of part redesigns to facilitate fabrication. For all possible
activity flows, three candidate points indicated by the numbered circles, 1, 2 and 3, are where the design-to-manufacture
transfer could occur. Point 1 represents the most secure separation, it is a traditional design and manufacturing scenario, in
which a design team accomplishes geometric tailoring and process/material selection. Point 3 represents the most
challenging scenario, in which the design team formulates a compromise DSP and sends it to the manufacturing team. The
manufacturing team then accomplishes material and process selection, geometric tailoring, and process planning. After
deciding the transfer point, as show in the player part of Fig. 2, engineering teams are assigned to these activities, and a
compromise DSP is used as a digital interface to separate design and manufacture. Since game theory will be used to solve
the compromise DSP, we use the term “player” to represent an engineering team and associated computer-based analysis

and synthesis tools. At the bottom of Fig. 2, in the various scenarios proposed, teams solve compromise DSPs and make
decisions using game protocols across digital interfaces. In this paper, we only test the second activity flow and the most
challenging separation at Point 3.
A digital interface is located at the separation point, where the compromise DSP is transferred (or shared) from the design
team to the manufacturing team. If the decisions can be made without additional information exchange or iteration, the
digital interface is clean and the product can be developed in a simple and sequential process. However, coupling between
teams’ decisions cause iteration. The design team requires input from the manufacturing team, e.g., expected mechanical
properties, surface finish, etc., but the manufacturing team cannot supply this information until the final product design has
been determined. Therefore, iteration is not due to difficulties with the information representation and communication
capability of compromise DSPs, but to couplings in the product realization process.

1.3 The theoretical development of game constructs
There are three possible relationships between two compromise DSPs; they may be solved sequentially, concurrently or as
coupled problems. Assume that product realization activities A and B are modeled into compromise DSPs, as shown in Fig.
3, where xi represents the set of design variables and si represents the set of variables that describe the states of the activity,
the remaining notation is similar to Fig. 1. Engineering team A and B are assigned to solve the compromise DSPs,
respectively.
As shown in Fig. 3, compromise DSPs which are solved concurrently have no common design or state variables. Neither
of the teams needs input from the other to make decisions. Hence regardless of the cooperation styles between the team, the
same solution is always obtained, in which ⊕ represents the combination of the results of two DSPs.
Digital Interface
Given
x A, s A
Find
x A , d i- , d i+
Satisfy
G A (x A, s A )  d i- -d i+  0
C A (x A, s A )  0
Minimize
Z A (x A )

Given
x B, sB
Find
x B , d i- , d i+
Satisfy
G B (x B, sB )  d i- -d i+  0
C B (x B, sB )  0
Minimize
Z B (x B )

(x A , s A )

(x B , sB )

Solution = (x A , s A )  (x B , sB )
Fig. 3 Solution of concurrent compromise DSPs

If the design or state variables of one compromise DSP are included in the other, the relationship between these two
compromise DSPs is sequential. In Fig. 4, team B uses team A’s design variables and state variables in DSPB. Hence, team
A makes a decision without any input, and this result is essential for team B to make its decision. Regardless their
cooperation style, the final solution is always obtained by the downstream team. Moreover, compromise DSPs with
concurrent and sequential relationships can be solved without any iteration across the digital interface and the digital
interface is always clean.
Digital Interface
Given
x A, s A
Find
x A , d i- , d i+
Satisfy
G A (x A, s A )  d i- -d i+  0
C A (x A, s A )  0
Minimize
ZA (x A )

x A , sA

Given
x B, sB, (x A, s A )
Find
x B , d -i , d i+
Satisfy
G B (x B, sB , x A, s A )  d i- -d i+  0
C B (x B, sB , x A, s A )  0
Minimize
ZB (x B )

(x A , s A ,x B , sB )
Solution = (x A , s A , x B , sB )
Fig. 4 Solution of sequential compromise DSPs

Coupled compromise DSPs, however, cause iterations across the digital interface, Fig. 5. In this situation, neither
compromise DSP can be solved independently because of the shared design variables and state variables, (xA, sA) and (xB,
sB). Traditionally, the trial and error method has been used to solve coupled DSPs. Since assumption has to be made to
initiate the trial and error process, this traditional approach may not guarantee consensus (convergence) and usually fails to
achieve superior results. In this paper, we use game theory to eliminate the iterations between the coupled DSPs, which is
capable of facilitates different interaction among multiple engineering teams (or players in game theory terminology):
cooperative, noncooperative, and leader/follower relationships. Rao and colleagues [24–27] and Badhrinath and Jagannatha
Rao [28] demonstrated cooperative and leader/follower protocols for product realization. Takai [29] presented a game-based
model to support the collaboration between teams with diverse background. Xiao et al. [30] presented a multi-objective

multidisciplinary design optimization approach based on non-cooperative protocol and gene expression programming. Chen
and Li [31] investigated the interaction between product design and manufacturing using all three protocols. Ge and Hu [32]
implemented three protocols to support the strategic decision making in a firm’s research and development activities. Lewis
and Mistree [33,34] presented mathematical constructs for collaborative decision-making using these protocols.
Digital Interface
Given
x A, sA , (x B, sB )
Find
x A , di- , di+
Satisfy
G A (x A , sA, x B, sB )  d i- -d i+  0
C A (xA , sA, x B, sB )  0
M in imize
Z A (x A )

xA , s A
xB , s B

Given
x B, sB , (x A, sA )
Find
x B , d -i , d +i
Satisfy
G B (x B, sB, x A, sA )  d i- -d i+  0
C B (x B, sB , x A , sA )  0
M inimize
Z B (x B )

Different solutions in different games
Fig. 5 Game solution of coupled compromise DSPs

1.3.1 Pareto or cooperative solution
The ideal scenario for collaboration is full cooperation between players in which both players (design and manufacturing)
have complete access to the information about each other’s decision-making processes, including their compromise DSPs
and associated engineering data and tools. The results of a fully cooperative scenario are obtained by combining all players’
DSPs, hence all goals, constraints, etc. in design and manufacturing are satisfied in one DSP. Mathematically, this is
expressed as
minimize Z  wA Z A  xA   wB Z B  xB  . (1)

Full cooperation rarely happens in practice because in a distributed environment it is difficult to access all decisionmaking information of another player. It is also not easy for a player to operate the engineering data and tools associated
with players from different disciplines. From the computing perspective, a combined large compromise DSP may contain
too many design variables to be solvable. A more practical scenario is one in which a player has only approximate
knowledge about the other players’ decision-making process, and must predict the other players’ decisions based on
available information. The available information may be obsolete or inaccurate; therefore, iterations are necessary to reach
consensus. Using a Taylor expansion, a player’s decision can be predicted based on his/her decision at the last iteration.
This mathematics of the game construct is presented in Refs. [33,34]:
 sAi ( x )  sAi 1  sA  x i 1  x  x i 1 

, (2)
 i
i 1
i 1
i 1
 sB ( x)  sB  sB  x  x  x 

in which xi‒1 and sAi 1 ( x) are respectively the values of local design variables and state variables in the previous iteration.
The first order derivatives ∇s(x) are constructed using a Global sensitivity equation approach. Approximate cooperation is
also an ideal situation that cannot be expected in practice. Players are inclined to make decisions to maximize their own
benefits without considering other players’ reactions. A clean digital interface between players becomes impossible because
of the iterations; and in a problem with many design variables, an approximate cooperative protocol may not converge.

1.3.2 Nash or noncooperative solution
At the other extreme of collaboration is noncooperation, in which the game players cannot receive additional input beyond
the other player’s compromise DSPs. Therefore, each player has to make a set of decisions that is rational to it by assuming
the other players’ reactions, their best reply correspondence (BRC). If there is an overlap between these players’ BRCs, the
result can be selected from their intersection. A game player constructs a BRC by representing the coupled non-local
variables with a set of mathematical formulations of local variables of another player. For instance, in Fig. 5, XA and XB are
respectively the design variable sets in players’ A and B’s compromise DSPs. xA is a subset of XA which must be
determined using information from player B’s compromise DSP. Then these two player’s BRCs are respectively
represented as xA = f(xB) and xB = f(xA) and the intersection of these BRCs can be found. If a player’s BRC cannot be
derived mathematically, design of experiment (DOE) techniques and response surface model works well to predict
quantitatively a player’s reaction to other players’ decisions. Using xAN ( xB ) to represent the Nash solution of xA, the
mathematics is:
 xAN ( xB ) : {xAN  X A : Z A ( xAN , xB )  min Z A ( xA , xB )}
xA  X A

 N
N
N
Z B ( xA , xB )} . (3)
 xB  xA  : {xB  X B : Z B ( xA , xB )  xmin
B X B

( xAN , xBN )  xAN ( xB )  xBN ( xA )

A noncooperative protocol can be implemented across a clean digital interface between players, but the process of
searching for intersections can be tedious and difficult. Noncooperative behavior should also be avoided because in product
realization, it is beneficial to strive for cooperation.

1.3.3 Stackelberg or leader/follower solution
A leader-follower, or Stackelberg, protocol fits well when one player dominates the decision-making process, or the
“influence of a certain domain on another is strongly unidirectional” [33]. When fabricating products with AM technologies,
we try to remove the burden of DfM from the design team who can then focus on product design, with the manufacturing
team taking as much responsibility as possible. Hence in the game, the manufacturing team must be the leader and the
design team the follower. A leader/follower protocol is a special instance of a noncooperative protocol. Assuming player A
is the leader, the mathematics is
minimize Z A ( xA , xB )
. (4)

N
satisfying xB  xB ( xA )

The process of solving a leader/follower game is shown in Fig. 6. In this case, the leader (manufacturing) constructs the
follower’s (design) BRC.
 At first, the leader reads in the follower’s compromise DSP. Since the follower’s decisions do not exceed the design
space formed by the bounds of design variables in its compromise DSP, the leader selects a set of points from this space
using DOE techniques [35]. In this work, we construct a quadratic model, using full factorial designs with points evenly
distributed in the design space, Fig. 6. Hence, 3n points are selected, where n is the number of variables shared between the
coupled DSPs.
 Second, the leader solves a set of follower’s compromise DSPs, and constructs response surface models that represent
the coupled design variables and state variables as the functions of the leader’s design variables.
 Third, coupled variables in the leader’s compromise DSP are replaced with the follower’s BRC. Then the leader solves
the compromise DSP without causing additional iteration.
 Fourth, the follower’s compromise DSP is solved based on the leader’s decision, which is not shown in Fig. 6.

Fig. 6 Solving a leader/follower game

A leader-follower game protocol facilitates collaborative decision making without iteration, hence clean digital interfaces
between game players can be implemented. If the times required to solve design and manufacturing compromise DSPs are
respectively td and tm, and n is the number of shared (coupled) design variables in the manufacturing compromise DSP, it
takes approximately 3ntd + tm to get results for a full factorial design experiment and a quadratic response surface model.
Moreover, since manufacturing related decisions are made before the final geometric shape of the product is determined, the
leader (manufacturing) in this game has more freedom to explore the design space and therefore can ensure better
manufacturability. As the result, a leader/follower game protocol can be used as an effective decision-making approach
across a clean digital interface of product design and manufacture.

2 A product realization scenario
In this section, a product realization scenario is presented to clarify the effectiveness of maintaining clean digital interface
using various game protocols in distributed collaborative decision making. It needs to be noted that due to the fast
development of AM technologies, the equipment and material used in this scenario are no longer the most advanced ones.

They are selected simply because the empirical equations that describe the properties of the manufacturing process are
readily available in Ref. [36], which can be used to support the decision making across digital interface. Gao et al. [37]
presented a thorough review of the recent developments of AM technologies.
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m

A distributed product realization environment is developed based on the activity flow B introduced in Fig. 2. A simple
part, the cover plate for a light switch, is developed as shown in Fig. 7. The basic size of the light switch is 80 mm × 120
mm. In order to demonstrate and test the customized product, the customer needs 30 copies within 48 h and the cost must be
less than 3000 USD. The light switch will be used in a standard housing and must be disassembled/assembled by hand. The
customer wants the printed cover plates to function similar to those mass produced using injection molding and
acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS).

4.5 mm

a

0.15 mm

Fig. 7 Light switch cover plate and the snap fit

A design and a manufacturing team are assigned to this task. The product will be developed following activity flow B in
Fig. 2, although in this case, geometric tailoring simply involves modifying several geometry dimensions to ensure that the
manufactured product function properly. We choose to set the design-manufacturing digital interface at the most
challenging point, before material selection and geometric tailoring, Point 3 in Fig. 2. Therefore, the design team will select
a material in product design, while the manufacturing team may very likely select a different material to fabricate it. Our
objective is to design and fabricate the batch of products without any iteration between design and manufacturing teams.
The product realization process is partitioned into four activities, i.e., product design, material selection, geometric
tailoring and process planning. In product design, the design team selects ABS as the material: Good strength, toughness,
and electrical resistance, and designs the basic geometric shape of the cover plate. In materials selection, the manufacturing
team selects an available resin with properties that are similar to those of ABS, SL-7510, and the machine SLA 3500. In
geometric tailoring, the manufacturing team has to modify geometry dimensions to ensure the parts printed using SL-7510
function the same as designed. In process planning, the manufacturing team determines the most suitable fabrication
parameters for the SLA 3500. For simplicity, geometric tailoring and material selection activities are combined with process
planning in one compromise DSP. It is worth noting that other AM technologies can also be selected, such as fused
deposition modeling, but the product realization process remain the same. It follows activity flow B in Fig. 2.

2.1 The design player’s compromise DSP
Since the basic dimensions of the cover plate are specified, the design team focuses on the thickness of the cover plate and
the snap fit that connects the cover plate to its base. The geometric shape of the snap fit is shown in Fig. 7. In product design,
the design variables are a, the thickness of snap fit, and t, the thickness of the cover plate. The customer specifies three
goals: (i) The assembly/disassembly force is as close to 2.943 N (0.3 kg-force) as possible, (ii) the deformation of the cover
plate during assembly/disassembly is as close to 5 mm as possible, and (iii) the volume of the cover plate should be as small
as possible. The target value of volume is the minimal value this goal could achieve given the bounds, 24054 mm3. Because
ABS is the designed material, the design team determines performance target using the properties of ABS. For ABS filled
with 10% glass fiber, Young’s modulus (E) is 3.5 GPa and its tensile strength (Y) is 59.3 MPa. In this scenario, the final
material properties of the printed part are determined by fabrication processes about which the designer has no information.
E and Y are coupled state variables within the manufacturing phase. The detailed design compromise DSP is shown in Fig. 8.
The equations of deformation properties, D, force, F, and volume, V, are shown in Eqs. (5)‒(7). D and F are quadratic
response surface models of a FEA model as shown in Fig. 8. V is estimated using the equations in [36].
D(a, t )  3.77  5.39a  2.81t  3.04(a  1.5)2  1.22(t  4)2  3.39(t  4)(a  1.5)
F  0.741Ea 3 , (6)

V  9600t  108a , (7)

where F is assembly/disassembly force (Newton), E is Young’s modulus (GPa).

Given

mm , (5)

 Customer requirements: batch of 30 parts, time  48 hours, cost  $3,000
 Cover plate material to mimic ABS, E = 3.5GPa, Y = 59.3MPa
 Basic shape of the cover plate
 Equation of relating the system variables are:
• Deformation: D(a, t)
• Force: F(a)
• Volume: V(a, t)
 From the manufacturing team
• Actual E and Y from the manufacturing team that uses SLA resins
Find
 a, thickness of snap fit and t, thickness of cover plate
 Deviation variables d i , d i , i = 1,2,3
Satisfy
 Goals:
• Assembly/disassembly force match 2.943 N (we prefer to match this
force as closely as possible—either underachievement or
overachievement of this goal is undesirable):
• Deformation match 5 mm (as

F
 d1  d1  1
2.943
above): D  d 2  d 2  1
5.0

• Volumes as small as possible (smaller values are preferred):

V
 d3  1
24054

 Constraint: Maximum stress smaller than tensile strength

 max  Y

 Bounds on design variables
0.5mm  a  2.5mm
2.5mm  t  5.5mm

 Deviation variables

d i , d i  0 , d i  d i  0 , i = 1, 2, 3
Minimize
The deviation function (Archimedean formulation)
3

Z D  Wi (d i  d i )
i 1

3

where Wi  1,
i 1

Wi  0 .

Fig. 8 The design player’s compromise DSP

Fig. 9 Finite element analysis of cover plate

The design compromise DSP is formulated with detailed mathematical functions. The computer implementation of this
compromise DSP forms the design team’s digital interface which is then sent to the manufacturing team. From this interface
the manufacturing team learns the necessary information about the product design. The design team can either transfer the
compromise DSP as a text file or as a piece of code which accepts input E and Y and generates output a and t. The
manufacturing team does not need to know the detailed software operation and data processing in the design activity, while
still be able to make correct design decisions by doing the calculation or running the code.

2.2 The manufacturing player’s compromise DSP
The manufacturing compromise DSP is shown in Fig. 10. There are three system variables to be determined: Layer
thickness, LT; hatch overcure, HOC; and fill overcure, FOC. The five goals are: (i) The least possible time, (ii) least cost,
(iii) surface finish as smooth as possible (this is measured by the largest roughness on the part where support structure is
generated), (iv) the final Young’s modulus as close to 3.5 GPa as possible, and (v) tensile strength as large as possible.
Clearly, some targets for these goals are obtained from the design compromise DSP, such as Young’s modulus and tensile
strength. The manufacturing team assigns the other three target values based on its experience. For instance, the target value
for time is set as 20 h, which the manufacturing team thinks is difficult to achieve and can serve as a target. A
corresponding constraint, PT ≤ 48 h, is added to ensure the customer requirements are meet. In addition, the layer thickness
is a discrete variable with only three possible values: 2, 4 and 8 mil (1 mil=0.0254 mm). The bounds of HOC and FOC
differ with the value of LT. Detailed derivations of Eqs. (8) to (12) are presented in Ref. [36]. English units mil and in (1
in=25.4×10‒6 mm) are used here because these are the only units for the setting of the machine. Obviously, the
manufacturing team cannot determine these variables without knowing the final geometric information about the cover plate,
including t and a.
cost = BS × (65BT+ 30), (8)
where BT is the single product build time (unit: h), BS is batch size, and the unit of the cost is USD. BT= Part build time +
Support build time. Surface finish is described using roughness, y, of the surface. It is estimated using a set of experimental
equations.
Up facing surface models:
LT = 2 mil, build orientation between (0o, 90o), y = 58729979x2 + 16441x + 64
LT = 4 mil, build orientation between (0o,15o), y = ‒46917308831x2+365676540x–711625
(9)
LT = 4 mil, build orientation between (15o, 90o), y = 43263055x2 + 16028x + 131
LT = 8 mil, build orientation between (0o, 30o), y = ‒1919977114x2 + 27802608x – 98799
LT = 8 mil, build orientation between (30o, 90o), y = ‒23917363x2 + 349649x + 406
Any layer thickness, build orientation is 0o, y = 6
Down facing surfaces:
LT = 2 mil, build orientation between (90o, 150o), y = 150441348x2 – 146261x + 76
LT = 2 mil, build orientation between (150o, 180o), y = 9778267616x2 – 35966307x +33258
(10)
LT = 4 mil, any build orientation, y = 60930230x2 – 177900x + 164
LT = 8 mil, any build orientation, y = 27102824x2 – 198948x + 429
Any layer thickness, build orientation is 180o, y = 243
where x is cusp height (unit: in, 1 in=25.4 mm), and y is roughness (unit: in).
Young’s modulus = 903.42 + 121LT + 498HOC + 0.15LT × LT –25.75HOC∙HOC‒33.25LT∙HOC, (11)
Tensile strength= 24.6948 + 6.1168LT + 4.5286 HOC‒0.4844 LT∙LT –0.1706HOC∙HOC‒0.3326LT∙HOC, (12)

where LT is the layer thickness (unit: mil, 1 mil=0.0254 mm), HOC is the hatch overcure (unit: mil), FOC is fill overcure
(unit: mil), and the unit of Young’s modulus and tensile strength is MPa.
Given

The CAD model of the light switch cover:

Thickness of cover plate, t (mm)

Thickness of snap fit, a (mm)

Equations for the system variables are:

Time: PT (BT)

Cost: CS (BT)

Default surface finish: SF (LT)

Young’s modules: E (LT, HOC)

Tensile strength: Y (LT, HOC)
Find

The rapid prototyping parameters:

LT, layer thickness (mil)

HOC, hatch overcure (mil)

FOC, fill overcure (mil)

Deviation variables d i , d i
Satisfy

Goals:





PT
 d1  1
20
CS
Cost 2000 USD (smaller values are preferred):
 d 2  1
2000
SF
Surface finish 0.2 mil (smaller values are preferred):
 d 3  1
0.2
E
Young’s modulus 3.5 GPa (match):
 d 4  d 4  1
3.5
Time about 20 h (smaller value preferred):



Tensile strength 59.3 MPa (larger values are preferred):

Y
 d5  1
59.3

Constraints:

SFm  6 in

CS  3000 USD

PT  48 h

BS = 30

Bounds on design variables:

2 mil  HOC2  6 mil, 3 mil  HOC4  7 mil, 1 mil  HOC8  5 mil

12 mil  FOC2  16 mil, 4 mil  FOC4  8 mil, 2 mil  FOC8  6 mils

Derivation variables:
d i , d i  0; d i  d i  0 , i = 1, 2, …, 5
Minimize
The deviation function (Archimedean formulation)


5

Z M  Wi (d i  d i )
i 1

where

5

W
i 1

i

 1, Wi  0 .

Fig. 10 The manufacturing player’s Compromise DSP

These compromise DSPs pack design requirements and knowledge about the design space and the capability and
constraints of product design and manufacturing into integrated decision models. The part’s CAD model cannot be
explicitly represented in the compromise DSP hence is linked as a data file. The teams can exchange their information using
compromise DSPs as digital interfaces. Since neither of these compromise DSPs can be solved independently because they
are coupled by the geometric information a and t and the knowledge of the manufacturing result Y and E, the principles of
game theory are used to solve them. Depending upon the cooperation between design and manufacturing game players,
three different games are formulated. In the cooperative game, all eight goals in both compromise DSPs are satisfied
together.
min Z game  wD Z D  wM Z M . (13)

Sometimes, players cannot communicate because of barriers to information exchange in the distributed environment, so a
noncooperative game is formulated. The mathematical formulation of a noncooperative game is
min Z M (BRC D )  min Z D (BRCM ) . (14)

If a design compromise DSP can be successfully transferred to the manufacturing player, a leader/follower game is
formulated. When the manufacturing team is leader,
min Z M (BRC D ) . (15)

3 Results from game protocols
In this section, the coupled design and manufacturing problem is solved using the three protocols, and the effects of the
choice of game protocols on the results are discussed. For the purpose of comparison, the results obtained using traditional
trial and error methods is also presented. To ensure that the results are comparable, in each case all goals are assigned equal
weights. Generally, the smaller the deviation value, the better the results. A simple flow chart of the solution process of
games on a computer is presented in Fig. 11.

read in design and manufacturing decision templates
Cooperative Game

combine
decision
templates

run
combined
decision
template

Noncooperative Game

Leader/Follower Game

manuf. player
design
experiments
in [a,t]

design player
design
experiments
[LT,HOC,FOC]

design player
design
experiments
in [a,t]

run manuf.
decision
template

run design
decision
template

run design
decision
template

construct
manuf.
BRC

construct design
BRC

construct design
BRC

solve BRC
equations for
intersection

run manuf.
decision
template
run design
decision
template

print results

Fig. 11 Solution process for games (manuf.: Manufacturing)

The solution process basically follows the mathematical formulation presented in Section 2.3. First, the compromise
DSPs for design and manufacturing are formulated and the appropriate game constructs are identified. There are two steps
to solving cooperative games, combining and then solving the compromise DSPs. Solving noncooperative games is a
concurrent process, in which both players design experiments, solve a set of compromise DSPs, construct mathematical
functions of players’ BRCs and search for the intersection. In a leader/follower game only the design player (follower) goes
through the process of constructing a BRC.

3.1 Results of trial and error approach
Solving a coupled design and manufacturing problem using the trial and error approach is a simulation of the traditional
decision-making process in product realization. In this case, the design player starts with the material properties of ABS
which are E = 3.5 GPa and Y = 59.3 MPa. Then the design compromise DSP is solved resulting in a = 1.0 mm and t = 3.1
mm. The manufacturing player makes decisions using the actual material properties of SL7510 resin and obtains the values
of E = 2.3 GPa, and Y = 46.3 MPa. The part is then redesigned in the geometric tailoring stage. After several iterations, the
final results of the design and manufacturing compromise DSPs converge are listed in Table 1.
Table 1 Results from the Traditional Trial-and-Error Approach
Variable
Value
System variable
a/mm
1.197
t/mm
2.500
LT/mil
8.000
HOC/mil
2.649
FOC/mil
2.000
State variable
Force/N
2.946
Deformation/mm
4.680
Volume/mm3
24129.280
Time/h
24.630
Cost/USD
2500.900
Finish/mil
0.243
E/GPa
2.350
Y/MPa
46.380

Deviation

0.165136

d+ = 0.000539, d= 0
d+ = 0, d= 0.063965
d+ = 0.003129, d = 0
d+ = 0.231500, d = 0
d+ = 0.250449, d = 0
d+ = 0.215000, d = 0
d+ = 0, d = 0.338601
d+ = 0, d = 0.217904

Given a good starting point, results converge within 3‒4 iterations. Most of the goals come very close to their target
values. The overall deviation is calculated with equal weights. Because this procedure requires several iterations, the digital
interface between design and manufacture is not clean. The design burden is also heavy because geometric tailoring has to
be accomplished by the design team.

3.2 Fully cooperative protocol
The fully cooperative protocol is implemented by combining two compromise DSPs as Eq. (1), and an approximate
cooperative protocol is implemented using the first order Taylor expansion (Eq. (2)). In this problem, results from the fully
and approximate cooperative protocols are identical as shown in Table 2. We use an exhaustive search method to solve the
combined compromise DSPs. For complex problems, a combined DSP may be unsolvable because it may be nonlinear or
may include multiple discrete and continuous variables.

Table 2 Results from fully cooperative protocol
Variable
System variable
a/mm
t/mm
LT/mil
HOC/mil
FOC/mil
State variable
Force/N
Deformation/mm
Volume/mm3
Time/h
Cost/USD
Finish/mil
E/GPa
Y/MPa

Value

Deviation

1.220
2.500
8.000
1.600
2.000

0.160609

2.943
4.880
24131.760
23.990
2459.480
0.243
2.186
45.180

d+ = 0, d = 0
d = 0, d = 0.023933
d+ = 0.003233, d = 0
d+ = 0.199500, d = 0
d+ = 0.229739, d = 0
d+ = 0.215000, d = 0
d+ = 0, d = 0.375343
d+ = 0, d = 0.238122
+

The ideal situation has a slightly smaller overall deviation than that of the traditional trial and error approach; thus, there
is better overall goal achievement. But the results from the fully cooperative protocol are not necessarily optimal. Different
players have different goals and thus they may use different weights for the goals, which would result in different values of
the overall deviation. Hence a superior result in an ideal situation does not necessarily guarantee a superior result from the
perspective of a certain player, who is only concerned about that player’s individual goals.

3.3 Noncooperative protocol
The noncooperative game of this case is presented as Eq. (13). The manufacturing player’s BRC consists of quadratic
response surface models of LT, HOC, and FOC. The experiment points and corresponding results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Experimental Results of Noncooperative Games
Design player
Experim
ent
LT
a
t
1
2
1.367
2.714
2
2
1.173
2.500
3
2
1.110
2.500
4
4
1.319
2.637
5
4
1.177
2.500
6
4
1.140
2.500
7
8
1.239
2.508
8
8
1.183
2.500
9
8
1.210
2.500

HOC
1
4
7
1
4
7
1
4
7

a
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.5
2.5
2.5

Manufacturing player
t
HOC
2.5
2.651
4.0
1.897
5.5
0
2.5
2.649
4.0
1.896
5.5
0
2.5
2.647
4.0
1.894
5.5
0

The design player solves a set of manufacturing compromise DSPs with changing values of a and t. In this case, LT and
FOC are always 8 mils and 2.0 mils; therefore, only the HOC values are shown in the table. If t = 5.5 mm, the
manufacturing player fails to make decisions because the time and cost constraints are violated and the value of HOC = 0
mil is assigned here. Since HOC∈ [1, 5] mils, the response model of HOC can still satisfy the accuracy requirements.
Concurrently the manufacturing player constructs the BRC of the design team by representing a and t in the form of f(LT,
HOC, FOC). Since HOC has different bounds at each LT value, we select the largest bounds in the experiments which may
cause some errors. One method of handling this problem is to construct different response surface models at different HOC
bounds, and use the average value to solve the design compromise DSP. Using MiniTab®, both players’ BRCs are
constructed.
BRCDesign:
a( LT , HOC )  1.50  0.0296 LT  0.103HOC  0.00632 LT  HOC  0.000333LT 2  0.00591HOC 2
, (16)

2
2
t ( LT , HOC )  2.85  0.0376 LT  0.0996 HOC  0.00567 LT  HOC  0.00035 LT  0.00665 HOC

BRCManufacture:
 HOC (a, t )  1.37  0.00333a  1.15t  0.000167 a 2  0.254t 2  0.000667 at
. (17)

 FOC  2.0 mil, LT  8 mil

The results of a noncooperative game, shown in Eq. (14), are obtained by combining and solving the above equations,
Table 4. The overall deviation is obviously larger than that of the fully cooperative protocol, which adds weight to the view
that usually players cannot make superior decisions when there is lack of cooperation. Each player considers only the local
benefit when making isolated decisions, which can impair the overall objective of the product realization process. The large
deviation value could also be due to errors introduced during construction of the response surface models.

Table 4 Results from a non-cooperative protocol
Variable
System variable
a/mm
t/mm
LT/mil
HOC/mil
FOC/mil
State variable
Force/N
Deformation/mm
Volume/mm3
Time/h
Cost/USD
Finish/mil
E/GPa
Y/MPa

Value

Deviation

1.320
2.640
8.000
1.900
2.000

0.200169

3.798
4.990
24486.560
24.100
2466.790
0.243
2.230
45.560

d+ = 0.291831, d = 0
d+ = 0, d = 0.001693
d+ = 0.059556, d = 0
d+ = 0.205000, d = 0
d+ = 0.233394, d = 0
d+ = 0.215000, d = 0
d+ = 0, d = 0.363182
d+ = 0, d = 0.231694

3.4 Leader/Follower protocol
The leader/follower protocol is a special case of the noncooperative protocol, but the decision-making principles are
different. In a noncooperative protocol, players make decisions concurrently, and a final solution is derived from the
intersection of players’ BRCs. The leader/follower protocol is a more practical simulation of a product realization process in
which other players make decisions considering the dominant player’s decision. The results of the leader/follower game, Eq.
(15), are the same as those obtained by using a trial and error approach, as shown in Table 1. These results are superior to
those from the noncooperative protocol. Therefore, cooperation, in any form, can improve engineers’ decisions from the
overall perspective. Although the manufacturing player makes a decision by assuming the design player’s reaction, and
errors are introduced when constructing the follower’s BRC, superior decisions can still be made using the leader/follower
protocol. Note that a solution which is as “good” as that obtained using the traditional trial and error approach is believed to
be superior, or good enough.
Some interesting observations can be made by analyzing the various solutions. First, the cover plate thickness, t, layer
thickness, LT, and fill overcure, FOC, remain unchanged in all three protocols. This is because the cover plate has a large
flat surface and is fabricated with snap fits facing down. Because the build time of the selected AM machine is mostly
decided by the part’s projection area on the platform and the part height after orientation, t dominants the building time. In
this case, the constraint, PT ≤ 48 h, forces the lower bound of t = 2.5 mm and upper bound of LT = 8 mil be selected. FOC
is driven to the lower bound, FOC = 2 mil, because of the Young’s modulus and tensile strength targets. That is, since the
product must satisfy the deformation and disassembly/assembly force requirements, the minimal FOC within the range 2
mil ≤ FOC8 ≤ 6 mil is chosen so that a more solid product can be built. This is reasonable from the engineering perspective,
hence demonstrates the validity of the decision-making approach.
Response surface methodology and DOE techniques provide the game player tools for predicting players’ behaviors, as
shown in Fig. 12. In process planning, since LT and FOC are mostly controlled by the time constraints, only HOC is
directly affected by the product design. In the HOC response surface, it is clear that t has an important influence on HOC,
and a does not. a is the thickness of snap fits which have a small projection area, and hence a does not dominate the process
planning parameters. As shown in the left graph in Fig. 12, when t changes from its lower to its upper bounds, HOC reduces
rapidly in order to build the prototypes in shorter time. When t reaches 4.5‒5.5 mm, the manufacturing player can no longer
accomplish its task.

Fig. 12 Response surface model of HOC, a and t

Response surface models of a and t in Fig. 12 also explain the effects of a manufacturing team’s decisions on product
design. When building the product using AM technologies, low LT and HOC values result into long times, but high product
quality, such as good surface finish, high strength. If the manufacturing player selects lower values for LT and HOC, it
means the manufacturing player has the capability of handling this task. Then design player enjoys more freedom to change
the design to meet other customer requirements. However, in this scenario, LT is at its upper bound, which restrains the

scope of a and t that the designer can explore without sacrificing product quality. This also demonstrates that the DfM
process depends greatly on product manufacturability and the capability of the manufacturing team.
The deviation values are represented in Fig. 13 in which the deviations from the goals for each protocol are compared.
Clearly, the general design goals are satisfied well except the force goal from the noncooperative protocol. Relatively, the
manufacturing goals are more difficult to achieve, as shown by larger deviation values. As the cover plate is oriented with
snap fits facing down, the largest roughness happens at the large flat surface on which the support structure is generated.
From Eq. (9), the roughness for this orientation maintains a consistent value, 0.243 mil, shown as the same deviation values
of the surface finish goal in all the games. It is also shown that in this case, different protocols do not greatly differentiate
between the product design and manufacturing results.
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

Force Deform. Volume
Trial&Error

Cooperation

Time

Cost

Finish

Noncooperation

E

Y

Leader/Follower

Fig. 13 Deviation values of goals

In Fig. 14, the overall deviation of this problem and the deviation of design and manufacturing from different protocols
are shown. The fact that noncooperative protocols show the worst overall deviation and the fully cooperative protocol
achieves the best result is not unexpected. Also, the very similar manufacturing deviations in all protocols reveal that
different product design and collaboration protocols do not significantly influence the manufacturing process. This
strengthens the statement that AM technologies are flexible enough to fabricate a product without being greatly constrained
by its design. As far as the deviation from the design goals, the cooperative protocol yields a superior design. The
significantly inferior design resulting from the noncooperative protocol explains that without cooperation with a
manufacturing team, a design team cannot design a superior product even when powerful manufacturing capability is
available.

Fig. 14 Deviation values of design and manufacturing

Also, in Fig. 14, in the leader/follower protocol, the manufacturing deviation is slightly better than in a fully cooperative
protocol. The reason for this is that the manufacturing player makes decisions before the design player does and the
manufacturing player enjoys a larger design space and more freedom to select superior fabrication parameters. In the fully
cooperative protocol, although the manufacturing player can also explore the entire design space, he/she cannot dominate
the process because all goals should be satisfied at the same time. In the traditional trial and error protocol, because the
design player decides the exact product shape, the manufacturing player can only search within a smaller design space and
cannot find a superior result from the overall perspective. Since our research objective is to give manufacturing team more
responsibility, a leader/follower protocol is shown to be effective. Again, although the leader/follower protocol and trial and
error approach deliver the same solution, decisions in the leader/follower game are made without causing iteration across
the digital interface, hence it keeps the interface clean.

4 Closure
In this paper, an engineering example is presented to verify the idea of collaboration by separation. In the context of
fabricating parts using AM technologies, we facilitate collaborative product realization by constructing clean digital
interfaces between engineering teams. Clean digital interfaces separate the activities of engineering teams and organize the
product realization process into a simple and sequential architecture. In the cases presented in Section 2, activity flow B and
separation Point 3, noncooperative and leader/follower protocols facilitate collaborative decision making without causing
iteration (Tables 4 and 1). Therefore, the digital interface between design and manufacturing teams is clean. The clean
digital interface is proven to be effective in a distributed environment in which information transfer is difficult and some
information may not be available. There are some interesting points obtained from our research:
 A distributed environment may impair cooperation between engineering teams, but collaboration can still be
implemented by constructing clean digital interfaces between these teams and making decisions using game theoretical
principles;
 A compromise DSP is capable of representing an engineering team’s knowledge and rationales; this formulation can
be shared with and understood by other teams;
 In the context of fabricating product using AM technologies, at least for simple parts, design can be successfully
separated from manufacturing immediately following geometric shape design. The manufacturing team is capable of
accomplishing material and process selection, DfM or geometric tailoring, and process planning. In this case, the most
ambitious design to manufacturing transfer point, Point 3 of activity flow B, Fig. 2 is demonstrated.
 When solving coupled design and manufacturing problems, the traditional trial and error approach causes iterations,
which should be avoided. Fully cooperation requires engineering teams be able to access all information and solve a
compromise DSP comprising all the design variables; this usually cannot be achieved. Noncooperation cannot guarantee
superior decisions and should be avoid also. The leader/ follower approach is an effective game protocol that can help
engineering teams make superior decisions.
 In practice, we do not have to solve all three games for one problem. The choice of game protocols is determined by
considering customer requirements and specific situations and the anticipated availability of information at different stages
in the product realization process. A noncooperative game, in this case, is solved when information exchange between
engineering teams is difficult. A leader/follower game should be solved when one game player dominates the decisionmaking process. A cooperative game is solved when players are familiar with each other’s activities or when players want
to explore the most preferable scenario. Generally, cooperation should be encouraged, and noncooperation should be
avoided whenever it is possible.
Although we have made progress we also recognize that but a single example has been presented here and the successful
separation of design and manufacturing activities relies greatly on the flexible AM technology. However, we believe that
the separation of engineering teams using a clean digital interface is useful for implementing collaborative product
realization in a distributed environment.
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